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Abstract
We study a vertical market with an upsteam supplier and multiple downstream retail-
ers. Demand uncertainty falls to the supplier who acts first and sets a uniform wholesale
price before the retailers observe the realized demand and engage in retail competition.
Our focus is on the supplier’s optimal pricing decision. We express the price elasticity of
expected demand in terms of the mean residual demand (MRD) function of the demand
distribution. This allows for a closed form characterization of the points of unitary elas-
ticity that maximize the seller’s profits and the derivation of a mild unimodality condition
for the seller’s objective function that generalizes the widely used increasing generalized
failure rate (IGFR) condition. A direct implication is that optimal prices between differ-
ent markets can be ordered if the markets can be stochastically ordered according to their
MRD functions or equivalently to their elasticities. Based on this, we apply the theory of
stochastic orders to study the response of the supplier’s optimal price to various features of
the demand distribution. Our findings challenge previously established economic insights
about the effects of market size, demand transformations and demand variability on whole-
sale prices and indicate that the conclusions largely depend on the exact notion that will
be employed. We then turn to measure market performance and derive a distribution free
and tight bound on the probability of no trade between the supplier and the retailers. If
trade takes place, our findings indicate that ovarall performance depends on the interplay
between demand uncertainty and level of retail competition. We illustrate our results with
numerical examples.
Keywords: Monopoly Pricing, Decreasing Generalized Mean Residual Demand, Demand Un-
certainty, Unimodality, Comparative Statics, Stochastic Orders
2010 MSC: 91A10, 91A40
1 Introduction
Economic globalization and rapidly evolving digital marketplaces have added complexity to the
firms’ pricing decisions. While firms are more efficient in the production and trade of large
amounts of goods at low cost over the globe, contemporary markets exhibit some inherent
variabilities that cannot be eliminated. Based on technological innovations or marketing com-
petition, sellers often launch new or differentiated products for which demand is unkown or they
introduce existing ones to new and rather unpredictable emerging markets, [12]. In other cases,
firms sell their products as wholesalers in markets for which they have asymmetrically less in-
formation than local retailers. Or they sell the same product over competitive online platforms
that are characterized by highly diversified clienteles and large demand volatility. In all these
cases, the firms employ elaborate marketing strategies and contract with their counterparts
to mitigate uncertainties and gain access to more information about market characteristics.
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However, after all efforts, some uncertainty persists and the final point of interaction between
wholesaler and retailer or more generally, between seller and buyer remains the single selling
price, [38, 31]. Under these circumstances, it is still relevant to ask: How should firms (sellers)
price under demand uncertainty?
1.1 Motivation, Objectives and Results
In the present study, we formulate this problem in the context of a two-stage vertical market:
in the first stage, a monopolistic firm sets a uniform price knowing only the distribution of the
retail demand, and in the second stage, the retailers compete after the market demand has been
realized. The timing of demand realization aids the study of optimal pricing under uncertainty
instead of optimal stocking decisions, [8]. To further isolate the effects of the seller’s pricing
decision from the various strategic considerations about negotiation power, marketing and pro-
duction, we consider price-only contracts1. Accordingly, we assume that the monopolistic firm
can produce unlimited quantities at zero cost and that the downstream retailers are symmetric.
As [46] argues, the assumption of symmetry enables the focus on purely competitive aspects
without getting into the issue of heterogeneity between the retailers. However, we allow for
product differentiation and multiple forms of competition between the retailers, cf. Table 1.
This only aims to show the generality of the present setting from the seller’s perspective. All
considered market structures can be essentially reduced to the problem of a firm selling a prod-
uct to a linear market with stochastic demand. This follows from the fact that under subgame
perfection, i.e., under the assumption that the retailers will follow their equilibrium strategies
(order quantities) in the second stage, there exists a unique equilibrium quantity which is the
same – up to a constant – for all the incorporated downstream market structures, cf. Table 1.
This implies a unique optimization problem for the monopolistic supplier, cf. (4).
The supplier’s optimal price is determined in Theorem 3.1 along with necessary and sufficient
conditions on the demand distribution for its existence and uniqueness. The novelty of this
result is the closed form characterization of the optimal price and the derivation of a mild
unimodality condition for the seller’s objective function. Both statements utilize the mean
residual demand (MRD) function m (r) := E (α− r | α > r) of the random demand level α,
cf. (5), which measures the expected additional demand given that demand has reached or
exceeded a threshold r, see [26, 6]. Specifically, by expressing the price elasticity of expected
demand (PEED) in terms of the MRD function, cf. (8), we obtain that the demand has the
increasing PEED (IPEED) property if the expression m (r) /r is decreasing. Hence, optimal
prices that correspond to points of unitary PEED are expressed as fixed points of the MRD
function, m (r∗) = r∗, and are unique if the PEED is increasing or equivalently if m (r) /r is
decreasing. This unimodality condition generalizes the widely used increasing generalized failure
rate (IGFR) condition, [4, 29, 28, 47]2. The generality of the unimodality condition implies that
Theorem 3.1 incorporates essentially most distributions that are commonly used in economic
modeling, [37, 3]. The trade-off is the assumption of linear demand. Yet, linear markets have
been consistently in the spotlight of economic research not only due to their tractability but also
due to their accurate modeling of real situations. More importantly, the recent result by [12] that
linear demand is a good approximation for many of the currently studied theoretical models,
indicates that linear markets are not restrictive and provide an incentive for their systematic
study.
The characterization of the IPEED property and the seller’s optimal price in terms of the
MRD function, which conclude the technical part of the paper, offer a new viewpoint to the
1Apart from their practical relevance, price-only contracts are also theoretically supported in the setting of
monopoly pricing, see Section 1.2.
2This is shown in a companion work, [30] which is concerned with the technical aspects of distributions that
satisfy this property, i.e., distributions that convey the property of IPEED to markets with linear stochastic
demand.
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otherwise standard two-stage linear model that is studied here. In particular, the MRD function
establishes the link between the seller’s decision and the probabilistic theory of stochastic orders,
[43]. This provides the means to derive comparative statics results on the response of the optimal
price to various market characteristics (expressed as properties of the demand distribution) and
to measure market performance. This is done in Section 4 and Section 5, respectively. Without
loss of generality, we restrict our attention to Cournot competition among the retailers. The
key intuition, which is formally established in Lemma 4.1 is that the seller’s optimal price is
higher in less elastic markets which are precisely markets that can be ordered in the MRD
stochastic order, cf. [43]. In other words, if two demand distributions can be ordered in terms
of their MRD functions, then the supplier’s optimal price is higher in the market with the
dominating MRD function. In this way, Lemma 4.1 brings to the fore the full power of the
theory of stochastic orders [43], [26] and [5] as a tool to compare prices in markets with different
characteristics.
First, we focus on the effects of market size on the seller’s optimal price. Theorems 4.2
and 4.3 present a collection of results on transformations that are applied on an initially given
demand distribution. The statements capture an intuitive property of monotonicity: the seller’s
optimal price is higher in markets that are in some sense larger. However, they hinge on specific
assumptions on the demand distribution and it becomes obvious that the general statement
“larger markets give rise to higher prices” does not hold. This statement fails even if the most
straightforward setting of stochastic dominance as we show via an example in Section 4.1.3.
We then turn to the effect of demand variability. Does the seller charge higher/lower prices in
more variable markets? The answer to this question is inconclusive and largerly depends on
the notion of variability that will be employed. Theorem 4.4 gives two variability orders that
preserve monotonicity under mild additional assumptions: in both cases the seller charges a
lower price in the less variable market. This conclusion remains true under the mean preserving
transformation that is also used by [32, 31]. However, Theorem 4.4 requires some additional
assumptions and it becomes again apparant that the general statement “more variable markets
give rise to higher prices” does not hold. As we show in Section 4.2.3, this fails in the standard
case of parametric families of distributions that are compared in terms of their coefficient of
variation. The results from the comparative statics analysis are summarized in Table 2.
We then turn to measure market performance and efficiency. In Theorem 5.1, we derive a
distribution-free upper bound – over the class of distributions with decreasing MRD function
– on the probability of a stockout, i.e., of no trade between the supplier and the retailers. As
shown in Examples 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4, this bound is tight and cannot be further generalized to
IPEED distributions. In case that trade takes place, we measure market efficiency in terms of
the realized profits and their distribution between the supplier and the retailers, cf. Table 3.
The supplier’s profits are always higher if he is informed about the exact demand level. However,
there exists a range of intermediate demand realizations for which the supplier captures a larger
share of the aggregate profits in the stochastic market. In any case, retail competition benefits
the supplier. As intuitively expected, the retailers make higher profits for larger values of
realized demand if the supplier has priced under uncertainty. These results are summarized in
Theorem 5.5. Finally, in Theorem 5.6 we compare the aggregate realized profits between the
deterministic and stochastic markets. The outcomes depend on the interplay between demand
uncertainty and the level of retail competition. More specifically, there exists an interval of
demand realizations for which the aggregate profits of the stochastic market are higher than
the profits of the deterministic market. The interval reduces to a single point as the number
of downstream retailers increases, but is unbounded in the case of 2 retailers. In particular, for
n = 1, 2, the aggregate profits of the stochastic market remain strictly higher than the profits of
the deterministic market for all large enough realized demand levels. However, the performance
of the stochastic market in comparison to the deterministic market degrades linearly in the
number of competing retailers for demand realizations beyond this interval. This shows that
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uncertainty on the side of the supplier is more detrimental for the aggregate market profits
when the level of retail competition is high.
Our findings imply that even in the special case of linear demand uncertainty, general
predictions about the movements of prices in response to variable market characteristics can only
be made with caution. This conclusion hinges on the obtained characterization of the increasing
price elasticity property and the seller’s optimal price in terms of the demand distribution and
the utilization of the diverse theory of stochastic orders. In comparison to existing studies,
this treatment of the linear model provides a novel perspective. Its main contribution is that
the mean residual demand order is the most appropriate stochastic order to compare different
markets. Otherwise, the exact response of optimal prices depends on the exact measurement of
size or variability that will be used and broad statements are remarkably difficult. Intuitivitely,
this explains the diversity of price responses to market characteristics that is observed in practice
and indicates that many existing results can be challenged as model specific. Thus, the trade-off
between the restrictive linear demand assumption and a more general theoretical model seems
worth exploring in view of the flexibility of the stochastic orders approach and the resulting
managerial insight.
1.2 Related Literature
The motivation and modeling assumptions of the present study are more closely related to [12]
who study pricing of new products for which demand is unkown. They show that if the demand
curve is one of many commonly used, then a seller who prices as if demand was linear does
not perform far from optimal. This is a simple rule that highlights the wide applicability of
the linear model. [11] study the effects demand uncertainty under minimal information on the
customers’ valuation distribution and provide an optimal robust price that is lower than the
mean valuation. The optimal price becomes lower as the variance increases. [32] argue that
firms have to take important decisions when market information is still poor. By restricting to
the additive demand model and IFR demand distributions, they find that the firm is better off
when variability is reduced and that the optimal price decreases as variability increases.
The model of a single supplier and competing retailers has been widely studied from different
perspectives. Among other results about consumer’s welfare, [46] shows that there exist market
conditions for which the supplier’s optimal price is invariant to the number of downstream
retailers. This finding is recovered in the present setting, cf. Section 3.3. [50] consider a similar
setting but without demand uncertainty. In the case of symmetric retailers, they establish that
the retailers’ profits are highest and both the supplier’s and the total system’s profits are lowest
when the retailers collude. The reverse holds when the retailers engage in Cournot competition.
These results are also confirmed in the present setting, cf. Table 3. By comparison, Theorem 5.6
shows that when the supplier prices under uncertainty, the fraction of the aggregate profits of
the stochastic to the deterministic market, increase in the level of competition for lower demand
realizations and decrease for higher realizations. [48] study a similar setting which differs from
ours mainly in that there is no demand uncertainty. They recover the results of [50] and show
that among several market structures, the supplier charges the highest wholesale price when he
moves first and the retailers move second in a simultaneous Bertrand competition. The same
market structure, with one upstream supplier and several downstream competing retailers with
linear demand is also studied by [36] who focus on return policies. This leads naturally to the
study of stocking rather than pricing decisions.
Similarities regarding the technical assumptions can be found between the current model and
the vast literature on the price-setting newsvendor under stochastic demand, see e.g., [10, 51]
and [25]. However, these models consider a combined order-pricing decision which distinguishes
them from the present setting. The additive demand model with linear deterministic compo-
nent is used by [52] and [39]. More closely related is the study of [49]. They assume that the
additive demand has increasing price elasticity and that the demand risk distribution has the
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increasing failure rate (IFR) property. Our assumptions are more restrictive concerning the
demand function in the deterministic component (linearity assumption) but considerably gen-
eralize the distributions in the stochastic component. In the newsvendor setting with additive
demand, they establish that a stochastically larger demand will lead to a higher selling price
but not necessarily to higher order quantity or profits. By comparison, in the present model,
even prices may be lower in a stochastically larger demand, cf. Section 4.1.3.
An extensive survey of further cases that use the additive demand model with linear de-
terministic component is provided in [19]. [51] provide a broad list of models with additive
stochastic demand with linear component in chronological order up to [39]. [42] employ the
additive linear model to study unimodality conditions in the price-inventory problem of the
typical newsvendor. As the rest of the literature about the newsvendor, the results involve
inventory considerations and hence are quite distinct from ours. However, their unimodality
conditions have similarities to ones presented here, as the unimodality and elasticity conditions
of [22] and [23]. [47] studies unimodality conditions in the setting of one seller and one buyer
which is a special case of the present setting. Accordingly, the IGFR unimodality conditions
that he derives is a restriction of the DGMRD condition (or equivalently the increasing price
elasticity of expected demand) that is formulated here. His study is restricted in the technical
aspects and thus is more close in nature to our companion paper, [30].
The study of price-only contracts under demand uncertainty has a strong theoretical foun-
dation. [18] study optimal pricing schemes and show that if a supplier’s capacity is larger than
any potential demand, then the single pricing scheme is optimal. The result is supported by
[41] who show that the optimal pricing strategy for a monopolist facing a known demand dis-
tribution is to commit to a single price. However, [14] shows that this seizes to be the case if
the monopolist does not know the distribution of demand a priori as we assume in the present
paper. In this dispersed pricing is a better strategy. In contrast, [1] show that wholesale price
contracts are optimal even in the case of two competing chains. They also use the assumption
of symmetry to focus on the effects of pricing (or revenue sharing) contracts without any in-
fluence from supply chain heterogeneity. [20] show that wholesale price contracts, despite their
simplicity, can perform well in inducing reliable supply and hence, offer an explanation for the
widespread use of wholesale price contracts in business settings with unreliable supply. [38]
and [8] provide strong incentives for considering price-only contracts. Apart from the practical
prevalence, price-only contracts are relevant in modeling worst-case scenarios or the remaining
uncertainty (after any efforts have been made to reduce the initial uncertainty through more
elaborate schemes). Compelling arguments for the linear pricing scheme are also provided in
[46] and references cited therein.
In a interesting study, [31] find that in a vertical market of a single manufacturer and a single
retailer that is governed by a wholesale contract between them, less uncertainty may harm either
or both members of the supply chain. They restrict to IFR distributions and consider the case in
which demand is realized after the decision of the retailers. Their findings confirm that investing
in reducing uncertainty may not be worth the cost and provide an additional motivation to
study markets with (residual) demand uncertainty under price-only contracts. This is partially
confirmed by our findings in Section 5.2.1 which indicate demand realizations for which the
stochastic market outperforms the deterministic market in terms of aggregate profits. However,
in our model, the supplier is always better off with reduced uncertainty whereas the retailers
may be not. The model of demand realization after the decision of the supplier but prior to the
decision of the retailers is also employed in a purely game-theoretic setting by [15].
Related to the present setting in a more general context is the work of [7] who consider a
robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing with incomplete information
in which the seller only knows that the true demand distribution is in the neighborhood of
a given model distribution. They show that the equilibrium price for two common decision
criteria with multiple priors is lower then without demand uncertainty. [40] study the same
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problem in a more elaborate setting. For static, linear demand (as in the present case), they
show that increasing (decreasing/constant) pattern of demand uncertainty results in decreasing
(increasing/constant) price levels. [24] justifies the use of the additive linear model with non-
negative prices and argues that in general, the optimal prices under demand uncertainty are
higher than the optimal prices for mean demand [13] consider the pricing problem of a risk-
averse seller with private buyers valuations. Under the IGFR condition and the Bernoulli
utility function, they show that a risk-averse seller will post a lower price than a risk-neutral
counterpart.
Finally, in a companion paper [30], we recover the present elasticity condition and closed
form characterization of the seller’s optimal price, but focus on the technical properties of the
class of distributions that satisfy the unimodality condition of IPEED.
1.3 Outline
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we define the setting of the present
model and in Section 3, we establish the seller’s optimal price and the unimodality condition.
Section 4 includes the comparatitive statics analysis and Section 5 the study of market perfor-
mance. Section 6 concludes the paper with a brief summary of our results and some directions
for future research.
2 The Model
We consider a vertical market with a monopolistic upstream manufacturer, distributor or ser-
vice provider, henceforth eq:supplier, selling a homogeneous product (or resource) to n = 2
downstream symmetric retailers3 The supplier acts first (Stackelberg leader) and applies a lin-
ear pricing scheme without price differentiation, i.e., he chooses a unique wholesale price, r ≥ 0,
for all retailers. The supplier produces at a constant marginal cost which we normalize to zero.
This corresponds to the situation in which the supplier has ample quantity to cover any possible
demand by the retailers and his lone decision variable is his wholesale price, or equivalently his
profit margin, r ≥ 0.
Subsequently, the retailers compete in a market with retail demand level α. We focus on the
market in which the supplier is less informed than the retailers about the retail demand level
α. To model this, we assume that after the supplier’s pricing decision but prior to the retailers’
order decisions, a value for α is realized from a continuous (not-atomic) cumulative distribution
function (cdf) F , with finite mean Eα <∞ and nonnegative values, i.e., F (0) = 0. Equivalently,
F can be thought of as the supplier’s belief about the demand level and, hence, about the
retailers’ willingness-to-pay his price. We will write F¯ := 1−F for the tail distribution of F and f
for its probability density function (pdf) whenever it exists. The support of F will be denoted by
S, with lower bound L = sup {r ≥ 0 : F (r) = 0} and upper bound H = inf {r ≥ 0 : F (r) = 1}
such that 0 ≤ L ≤ H ≤ ∞. We don’t make any additional assumption about S: in particular,
it may or may not be an interval. The case L = H is not excluded4 and corresponds to the
situation where the supplier is completely informed about the retail demand level.
Given the demand realization α, the total quantity that the retailers will order from the
supplier is a function of the posted wholesale price r and will be denoted by q (r | α) :=∑n
i=1 qi (r | α). Using this notation, and under risk neutrality, the supplier aims to maximize
his expected profit function Πs, which is equal to
Πs (r) = r · Eαq (r | α) (1)
3To ease the exposition, we restrict to n = 2 retailers. As we show in Section 3.3, our results admit a
straightforward generalization to arbitrary number n of symmetric retailers.
4Formally, this case contradicts the assumption that F is continuous or non-atomic. It is only allowed to avoid
unnecessary notation and should cause no confusion.
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In general, depending on the form of second stage competition, the quantity q (r | α) may vary
or not be unique. In this paper, we focus on markets with linear demand as in [33], [39] and
[19] among others, which allow for a wide range of competition structures between the retailers
(Table 1). All these structures give rise – in equilibrium – to essentially the same (up to a
scaling constant) q (r | α) and hence to the same mathematical form for the supplier’s objective
function. More importantly, in all these structures, the second-stage equilibrium between the
retailers is unique and hence, q (r | α) is uniquely determined under the assumption that the
retailers follow their equilibrium strategies in the game induced by each wholesale price r ≥ 0
(subgame perfect equilibrium). Specifically, we assume that each retailer i faces the inverse
demand function
pi = α− βqi − γqj , (2)
for j = 3− i and i = 1, 2. Here, α/ (β + γ) denotes the potential market size (primary demand),
β/
(
β2 − γ2) > 0 the store-level factor and γ/β the degree of product differentiation or substi-
tutability between the retailers, [45, 48]. As usual, we assume that β ≤ γ. Each retailer’s only
cost is the wholesale price r ≥ 0 that she pays to the supplier. Hence, each retailer aims to
maximize her profit function Πi, which is equal to
Πi (qi, qj) = qi (pi − r) (3)
Given the demand realization α, the equilibrium quantities q∗i := q
∗
i (r | α) that maximize Πi for
i = 1, 2 are given for various retail market structures in Table 1 as functions of the wholesale price
r. Here, (α− r)+ denotes the positive part, i.e., (α− r)+ := max {0, α− r}. The assumption
of no uncertainty on the side of retailers about the demand level α implies that q∗i corresponds
both to the quantity that each retailer orders from the supplier and to the quantity that she
sells to the market.
Retail market structure Retailer i’s equilibrium order
[45]
Cournot competition – product differentiation q∗i =
1
2β+γ (α− r)+
Bertrand competition – product differentiation q∗i =
β
(2β−γ)(β+γ) (α− r)+
[36]
Single retailer no/full returns q∗ = 12β (α− r)+
Competing retailers (orders/price) – no returns q∗i =
1
2β+γ (α− r)+
Competing retailers (orders/price) – full returns q∗i =
β
(2β−γ)(β+γ) (α− r)+
[50]
Collusion between retailers – product differentiation q∗i =
1
β+γ (α− r)+
Table 1. Second-stage market structures and corresponding equilibrium quantities ordered from
the supplier.
The standard Cournot and Betrand outcomes arise as special cases of the above. In particular,
for γ = 0, the goods are independent and we have the monopoly solution q∗i =
1
2β (α− r)+. For
γ = β > 0, the goods are perfect substitutes with q∗i =
1
2β (α− r)+ in Bertrand competition (at
zero price) and q∗i =
1
3β (α− r)+ in Cournot competition. All of the above are assumed to be
common knowledge among the participants in the market (the supplier and the retailers).
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3 Equilibrium analysis: supplier’s optimal wholesale price
We restrict attention to subgame perfect equlibria5 of the extensive form, two-stage game.
Assuming that at the second stage, the retailers play their unique equilibrium strategies (q∗1, q∗2),
then, according to (1), the supplier will maximize Π∗s (r) = r ·Eαq∗ (r | α). For the competition
structures of Table 1, q∗ (r | α) has the general form q∗ (r | α) = λM (α− r)+, where λM >
0 is a suitable model-specific constant. Thus, at equilibrium, the supplier’s expected profit
maximization problem becomes
max
r≥0
Π∗s (r) = λM ·max
r≥0
rE (α− r)+ (4)
From the supplier’s perspective, we are interested in finding conditions such that the maximiza-
tion problem in (4) admits a unique and finite optimal wholesale price, r∗ ≥ 0.
3.1 Deterministic Market
First, we treat the case in which the supplier knows the primary demand α (deterministic
market). According to the notation introduced in Section 2, this corresponds to the case α =
L = H. In this case Π∗s (r) = λMr (α− r)+ and it is straightforward that r∗ (α) = α/2. Hence,
the complete information two-stage game has a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, under
which the supplier sells with optimal price r∗ (α) = α/2 and each retailer orders quantity q∗i as
determined by Table 1.
3.2 Stochastic Market
The equilibrium behavior of the market in which the supplier does not know the demand level
(stochastic market) is less straightforward. Now, L < H and the supplier is interested in
finding an r∗ that maximizes his expected profit in (4). For an arbitrary demand distribution
F , Π∗s (r) may not be concave (nor quasi-concave) and, hence, not unimodal, in which case
the solution to the supplier’s optimization problem is not immediate. To obtain a general
unimodality condition, we proceed by differentiating the supplier’s revenue function Π∗s (r), see
also [30]. First, since (α− r)+ is nonnegative, we write E (α− r)+ =
∫∞
0 P
(
(α− r)+ > u
)
du =∫∞
r F¯ (u) du, for 0 ≤ r < H. Since Eα <∞ and F is non-atomic by assumption, we have that
d
dr
E (α− r)+ =
d
dr
(
Eα−
∫ r
0
F¯ (u) du
)
= −F¯ (r)
for any 0 < r < H. With this formulation, both the supplier’s revenue function and its
first derivative can be expressed in terms of the mean residual demand (MRD) function of
α. In general, the MRD function m (·) of a nonnegative random variable α with cumulative
distribution function (cdf) F and finite expectation, Eα <∞, is defined as
m (r) := E (α− r | α > r) = 1
F¯ (r)
∫ ∞
r
F¯ (u) du, for r < H (5)
and m (r) := 0, otherwise, see, e.g., [43, 26] or [5]6. Using this notation, we obtain that
Π∗s (r) = λMrm (r) F¯ (r) and
dΠ∗s
dr
(r) = λM (m (r)− r) F¯ (r) = λMr
(
m (r)
r
− 1
)
F¯ (r) (6)
5Technically, these are perfect Bayes-Nash equilibria, since the supplier has a belief about the retailers’ types,
i.e. their willingness-to-pay his price, that depends on the value of the stochastic demand parameter α.
6In this literature, the MRD function is known as the mean residual life function due to its origins in reliability
applications.
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for 0 < r < H. Based on (6), the first order condition (FOC) for the supplier’s revenue function
is that m (r) = r or equivalently that m (r) /r = 1. We call the expression
` (r) :=
m (r)
r
, 0 < r < H (7)
the generalized mean residual demand (GMRD) function, see [30], due to its connection to the
generalized failure rate (GFR) function g (r) := rf (r) /F¯ (r), defined and studied by [27] and
[29]. Its meaning is straightforward: while the MRD function m (r) at point r > 0 measures the
expected additional demand, given the current demand r, the GMRD function measures the
expected additional demand as a percentage of the given current demand. Similarly to the GFR
function, the GMRD function has an appealing interpreation from an economic perspective, as it
is related to the price elasticity of expected or mean demand, ε (r) = −r · ddrEq (r | α) /Eq (r | α),
see also [49]. Specifically,
` (r) =
m (r)
r
=
(
− −F¯ (r)
m (r) F¯ (r)
· r
)−1
=
(
−r ·
d
drE (α− r)+
E (α− r)+
)−1
= ε−1 (r) (8)
which implies that ` (r) corresponds to the inverse of the price elasticity of expected de-
mand. Hence, the FOC asserts that the supplier’s payoff is maximized at the point(s) of
unitary elasticity. For an economically meaningful analysis, since realistic problems must have
a price elasticity that eventually becomes greater than 1 (see [28]), we give particular atten-
tion to distributions for which ` (r) eventually becomes less than 1, i.e., distributions for which
r¯ := sup {r ≥ 0 : m (r) ≥ r} is finite. Observe that for a nonnegative random demand α with
continuous distribution F and finite expectation Eα, m (0) = Eα > 0 and hence r¯ > 0.
Based on these considerations, it remains to derive conditions that guarantee the existence
and uniqueness of an r∗ that satisfies the FOC and to show that this r∗ indeed corresponds to
a maximum of the supplier’s revenue function. This is established in the following Theorem
which is the main result of the present Section.
Theorem 3.1 (Equilibrium wholesale prices in the stochastic market). Assume that the non-
negative demand parameter, α, follows a continuous (non-atomic) distribution F with support
S within L and H.
(a) Necessary condition: If an optimal price r∗ for the supplier exists, then r∗ satisfies the fixed
point equation
r∗ = m (r∗) (9)
(b) Sufficient conditions: If the generalized mean residual demand (GMRD) function, ` (r), of
F is strictly decreasing and Eα2 is finite, then at equilibrium, the supplier’s optimal price r∗
exists and is the unique solution of (9). In this case, r∗ = Eα/2, if Eα/2 < L, and r∗ ∈ [L,H),
otherwise.
Proof. Since F¯ (r) > 0 for 0 < α < H, the sign of the derivative dΠ
∗
s
dr (r) is determined by
the term m (r) − r and any critical point r∗ satisfies m (r∗) = r∗. Hence, the necessary part
of the theorem is obvious from (6) and the continuity of dΠ
∗
s
dr (r). For the sufficiency part, it
remains to check that such a critical point exists and corresponds to a maximum under the
assumptions that ` (r) is strictly decreasing and Eα2 < ∞. Clearly, m (r) − r is continuous
and limr→0+ m (r) − r = Eα > 0. Hence, Π∗s (r) starts increasing on (0, H). However, the
limiting behavior of m (r)− r and hence of dΠ∗sdr (r) as r approaches H from the left, may vary
depending on whether H is finite or not. If H is finite, i.e., if the support of α is bounded, then
limr→H− (m (r)− r) = −H. Hence, ` (r) eventually becomes less than 1 and a critical point r∗
that corresponds to a maximum exists without any further assumptions. Strict monotonicity
of ` (r) implies that this r∗ is unique. If H = ∞, then an optimal solution r∗ may not exist
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because the limiting behavior of m (r) as r →∞ may vary, see Example 3.3 or [9]. In this case,
the condition of finite second moment ensures that r¯ < ∞. In particular, as shown in [30], if
the GMRD function ` (r) of a random variable α with unbounded support is decreasing, then
limr→∞ ` (r) < 1 if and only if Eα2 is finite. This establishes existence. Uniqueness follows
again from strict monotonicity of ` (r) which precludes intervals of the form m (r) = r that give
rise to multiple optimal solutions.
To prove the second claim of the sufficiency part, note that Eα < 2L is equivalent to
m (L) < L. Then, the DGMRD property implies that m (r) < r for all r > L, hence r∗ < L.
In this case, m (r∗) = Eα − r∗ and hence r∗ is given explicitly by r∗ = Eα/2, which may be
compared with the optimal r∗ of the complete information case. On the other hand, if Eα ≥ 2L,
then for all r < L, m (r) = Eα− r ≥ 2L− r > r which implies that r∗ must be in [L,H).
The economic interpretation of the sufficiency conditions in part (b) of Theorem 3.1 is imme-
diate. By (8), demand distributions with the DGMRD property are precisely distributions that
exhibit increasing price elasticity of expected demand. By [30], Theorem 3.2, finiteness of the
second moment is required to ensure that the expected demand will eventually become elastic,
even in the case of unbounded support. In sum, part (b) characterizes demand distributions
that model linear markets with monotone and eventually elastic expected demand in terms of
their mathematical properties. These conditions are derived in a broad probabilistic context
and apply to distributions that may neither be absolutely continuous (do not possess a density)
nor have a connected support.
Remark 3.2. Strict monotonocity can be relaxed to weak monotonicity in the statement of
Theorem 3.1 without significant loss of generality. This relies on the explicit characterization
of distributions with MRD functions that contain linear segments which is given in Proposition
10 of [17]. Namely, m (r) = r on some interval J = [a, b] ⊆ S if and only if F¯ (r) r2 = F¯ (a) a2
for all r ∈ J . If J is unbounded, this implies that α has the Pareto distribution on J with scale
parameter 2. In this case, Eα2 = ∞, see Example 3.3, which is precluded by the requirement
that Eα2 < ∞. Hence, to replace strict by weak monotonicity – but still retain equilibrium
uniqueness – it suffices to exclude distributions that contain intervals J = [a, b] ⊆ S with b <∞
in their support, for which F¯ (r) r2 = F¯ (a) a2 for all r ∈ J .
Example 3.3 (Pareto distribution). The Pareto distribution is the unique distribution with
constant GMRD and GFR functions over its support. Let α be Pareto distributed with pdf
f (r) = kLkr−(k+1)1{L≤r}, and parameters 0 < L and k > 1 (for 0 < k ≤ 1 we get Eα = ∞,
which contradicts the basic assumptions of our model). To simplify, let L = 1, so that f (r) =
kr−k−11{1≤r<∞}, F (r) =
(
1− r−k) 1{1≤r<∞}, and Eα = kk−1 . The mean residual demand
of α is given by m (r) = rk−1 +
k
k−1 (1− r) 1{0≤r<1} and, hence, is decreasing on [0, 1) and
increasing on [1,∞). However, the GMRD function ` (r) = m (r) /r is decreasing for 0 < r < 1
and is constant thereafter, hence, α is DGMRD. Similarly, for 1 ≤ r the failure (hazard) rate
h (r) = kr−1 is decreasing, but the generalized failure rate g (r) = k is constant and, hence, α
is IGFR. The payoff function of the supplier is
Π∗s (r) = λMrm (r) F¯ (r) =
λM
(k − 1)
{
r (r − rk + k) if 0 ≤ r < 1
r2−k if r ≥ 1,
which diverges as r → ∞, for k < 2 and remains constant for k = 2. In particular, for k ≤ 2,
the second moment of α is infinite, i.e., Eα2 =∞, which shows that for DGMRD distributions,
the assumption that the second moment of F is finite may not be dropped for part (b) of
Theorem 3.1 to hold. On the other hand, for k > 2, we get r∗ = k2(k−1) as the unique optimal
wholesale price, which is indeed the unique fixed point of m (r).
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3.3 General case with n identical retailers
To ease the exposition, we restricted our presentation to n = 2 identical retailers. However, the
present analysis applies to arbitrary number n ≥ 1 of symmetric retailers for all competition-
structures that give rise to a unique second-stage equilibrium in which the total ordered quantity
depends on α via the term (α− r)+ as in Table 1. This relies on the fact, that in such markets,
the total quantity that is ordered from the supplier depends on n only up to a scaling constant.
Thus, the approach to the supplier’s expected profit maximization in the first-stage remains the
same independently of the number of second-stage retailers. To avoid unnecessary notation, we
present the general case for the classic Cournot competition.
Formally, let N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, with n ≥ 1 denote the set of symmetric retailers. A strategy
profile (retailers’ orders from the supplier) is denoted by q = (q1, q2, . . . , qn) with q =
∑n
j=1 qj
and q−i := q − qi. Assuming linear inverse demand function p = α − βq, the payoff function
of retailer i, for i ∈ N , is given by Πi (q, q−i) = qi (p− r). Under these assumptions, the
second stage corresponds to a linear Cournot oligopoly with constant marginal cost, r. Hence,
each retailer’s equilibrium strategy, q∗i (r), is given by q
∗
i (r) =
1
β(n+1) (α− r)+, for r ≥ 0.
Accordingly, in the first stage, the supplier’s expected revenue function on the equilibrium path
is given by Π∗s (r) = rq∗ (r) =
n
β(n+1)rE (α− r)+. Hence, it is maximized again at r∗ (α) = α/2
if the supplier knows α or at r∗ = m (r∗) if the supplier only knows the distribution F of α.
Based on the above, the number of second-stage retailers affects the supplier’s revenue function
only up to a scaling constant and Theorem 3.1 is stated unaltered for any n ≥ 1.
4 Comparative Statics
The closed form expression of (9) facilitates a comparative statics and sensitivity analysis on
the demand distribution’s paremeters via the rich theory of stochastic orders, see [43], [26] and
[5]. Because in equilibrium, both the total quantity q∗ = nn+1 (α− r∗)+ that will be sold to
the market and the retail price p∗ = α− q∗ are monotone in the wholesale price r∗, we restrict
henceforth attention to changes in r∗ as the distribution characteristics vary.
To obtain a meaningful comparison between different markets, we assume throughout equi-
librium uniqueness and hence, unless stated otherwise, we consider only distributions for which
Theorem 3.1 applies7. First, we introduce some notation. Let X1 ∼ F1, X2 ∼ F2 be two non-
negative random variables (or equivalently demand distributions) with MRD functions m1 (r)
and m2 (r), respectively, such that m1 (r) ≤ m2 (r) for every r ≥ 0. Then, we say that X1 is less
than X2 in the mean residual demand order, denoted by X1 mrd X28. This order plays a key
role in the present model. Specifically, by (8), we have that m1 (r) ≤ m2 (r) for any r ≥ 0 if and
only if ε2 (r) ≤ ε1 (r) for any r ≥ 0, i.e., if and only if the price elasticity of expected demand in
market X2 is less than the price elasticity of expected demand in market X1 for any wholesale
price r ≥ 0. This motivates the following definition: we will say that market X2 is less elastic
than market X1, denoted by X2 el X1, if ε2 (r) ≤ ε1 (r) for every r ≥ 0. Based on the above,
X2 el X1 if and only if X1 mrd X2. Using this notation, the following Lemma captures the
importance of the characterization in (9).
Lemma 4.1. Let X1 ∼ F1, X2 ∼ F2 be two nonnegative, continuous and strictly DGMRD de-
mand distributions with finite second moments. If X2 is less elastic than X1, then the supplier’s
optimal wholesale price is lower in market X1 than in market X2. In symbols, if X2 el X1,
then r∗1 ≤ r∗2.
7Since the DGMRD property is satisfied by a very broad class of distributions, see [3], [22] and [30], we do
not consider this as a significant restriction. Still, since it is sufficient (together with finitenes of the second
moment) but not necessary for the existence of a unique optimal price, the analysis naturally applies to any other
distribution that guarantees equilibrium existence and uniqueness.
8As mentioned above, the m (r) function is originally known as the mean residual life function. Accordingly
the mrd-order is known as the mrl-order, [43].
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Proof. By definition, X2 el X1 implies that ε2 (r) ≤ ε1 (r) for every r ≥ 0 which by (8) is
equivalent to `1 (r) ≤ `2 (r) for all r ≥ 0. Hence, by (9), 1 = `1 (r∗1) ≤ `2 (r∗1) < `2 (r) for all
r < r∗1, where the second inequality follows from the assumption that X2 is strictly DGMRD.
Since `2 (r
∗
2) = 1, it follows that r
∗
1 ≤ r∗2.
In short, Lemma 4.1 states that the supplier charges a lower price in a more elastic market.
Although trivial to prove once Theorem 3.1 has been established, it is the key to the comparative
statics analysis in the present model. Indeed, combining the above, the task of comparing the
optimal wholesale price r∗ for varying demand distribution parameters – such as market size or
demand variability – essentially reduces to comparing demand distributions (markets) according
to their elasticities or equivalently according to their MRD functions. Such conditions can be
found in [43] and provide the framework for the subsequent analysis. Tractable conditions that
enable the comparison of two distributions in terms of their MRD functions are given in [6].
4.1 Market Size
We start with the response of the equilibrium wholesale price r∗ to transformations that in-
tuitively correspond to a larger market. Unless otherwise stated, we assume that the random
demand is such that it satisfies the sufficiency conditions of Theorem 3.1 and hence that the
supplier’s optimal wholesale price exists and is unique.
4.1.1 Reestimating Demand
Let X denote the random demand in an instance of the market under consideration. Let c ≥ 1
denote a positive constant and Z an additional random source of demand that is independent of
X. Moreover, let r∗X denote the equilibrium wholesale price in the initial market and r
∗
cX , r
∗
X+Z
the equilibrium wholesale prices in the markets with random demand cX and X+Z respectively.
How does r∗X compare to r
∗
cX and r
∗
X+Z?
While the answer for r∗cX is rather straightforward, see Theorem 4.2 below, the case of
X +Z is more complicated. Specifically, since DGMRD random variables are not closed under
convolution, see [30], the random variable X+Z may not be DGMRD. This may lead to multiple
equilibrium wholesale prices in the X + Z market, irrespectively of whether Z is DGMRD or
not. To deal with the possible multiplicity of equilibria, we will write r∗W := {r : r = mW (r)} to
denote the set of all possible equilibrium wholesale prices. Here, mW denotes the MRD function
of a W ∼ FW demand distribution, e.g., W := X + Z. To ease the notation, we will also write
r∗W ≤ r∗V, when all elements of the set r∗W are less or equal than all elements of the set r∗V.
Theorem 4.2 largely confirms the intuition that wholesale prices are higher in the larger cX
and X + Z markets. However, it also reveals that this is not always the case, and particularly
for the X + Z market, that it hinges on additional, more restrictive assumptions for X and Z.
Theorem 4.2. Let X ∼ F be a nonnegative and continuous demand distribution with finite
second moment.
(i) If X is DGMRD and c ≥ 1 is a positive constant, then r∗X ≤ r∗cX .
(ii) If X is DMRD and Z is a nonnegative, continuous demand distribution with finite second
moment and independent of X, then r∗X ≤ r∗X+Z, i.e., r∗X ≤ r∗X+Z for any equilibrium
wholesale price r∗X+Z of the X + Z market.
Proof. The proof of part (i) follows directly from the preservation property of the mrd-order
that is stated in Theorem 2.A.11 of [43]. Specifically, since mcX (r) = cmX (r/c) is the MRD
function of cX, we have that mcX (r) = r · mX(r/c)r/c = r · ` (r/c) ≥ r · ` (r) = mX (r), for all r > 0,
with the inequality following from the assumption that X is DGMRD. Hence, X mrd cX which
by Lemma 4.1 implies that r∗X ≤ r∗cX .
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Part (ii) follows from Theorem 2.A.11 of [43]. The proof necessitates that X is DMRD
and hence requiring that X is merely DGMRD is not enough. Since, X is DMRD, we know
that r < mX (r) for all r < r
∗
X = mX (r
∗
X). Together with X mrd X + Z, this implies that
r < mX (r) ≤ mX+Z (r), for all r < r∗X . Hence, r∗X+Z ⊆ [r∗X ,∞), which implies that in this
case, r∗X is a lower bound to the set of all possible wholesale equilibrium prices in the X + Z
market.
4.1.2 Preservation of Market Size & Wholesale Price
Next, we turn attention to operations on demand distributions that preserve the mrd-order
and hence the order of wholesale prices. Specifically, let X1 ∼ F1, X2 ∼ F2 denote two different
demand distributions, such that X1 mrd X2. In this case, we know by Lemma 4.1 that r∗1 ≤ r∗2.
We are interested in determining transformations of X1, X2 that preserve the mrd-order and
hence the ordering r∗1 ≤ r∗2. Again, to avoid extensive case discriminations, we will restrict
attention to demand distributions that satisfy the sufficiency conditions of Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 4.3. Let X1 ∼ F1, X2 ∼ F2 denote two nonnegative, continuous and strictly DGMRD
demand distributions, with finite second moments, such that X1 mrd X2.
(i) If Z is a nonnegative, IFR distribution, independent of X1 and X2, then r
∗
X1+Z
≤ r∗X2+Z.
(ii) If φ is an increasing, convex function, then r∗φ(X1) ≤ r∗φ(X2).
(iii) If Xp ∼ pF1 + (1− p)F2 for some p ∈ (0, 1), then r∗X1 ≤ r∗Xp ≤ r∗X2.
Proof. Part (i) follows from Lemma 2.A.8 of [43]. Since the resulting distributionsXi+Z, i = 1, 2
may not be DGMRD nor DMRD, the setwise notation is necessary. Part (ii) follows from The-
orem 2.A.19 (ibid). Equilibrium uniqueness is retained in the transformed markets, φ (Xi) , i =
1, 2, since the DGMRD class of distributions is closed under increasing, convex transformations,
see [30]. Finally, part (iii) follows from Theorem 2.A.19. However, the DGMRD class is not
closed under mixtures and hence, in this case, the Xp market may have multiple equilibria,
which necessitates, as in part (i), the setwise statement for the wholesale equilibrium prices of
the Xp market.
In the case that X1 and X2 are strictly ordered in the mrl-order, then [35] show that the
mrl-order is closed under monotonically non-decreasing transformations and closed in a reversed
sense under monotonically non-increasing transformations. The mrl-order is also closed under
convolutions, provided that the convoluting distribution has log-concave density (as is the case
with many commonly used distributions, [2]), [34]. If instead of X1 mrd X2, X1 and X2 are
ordered in the stronger hazard rate, hr-order, i.e., if h1 (r) ≤ h2 (r) for all r ≥ 0, denoted by
X1 hr X2, then part (i) of Theorem 4.3 remains true by Lemma 2.A.10 of [43], even if Z is
merely DMRD (instead of IFR).
Although Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 are immediate once Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 4.1 have been
established, they provide non-trivial economic intuitions. In general, both Theorems imply that
if the supplier reestimates his expectations about the stochastic demand upwards, then he will
charge a higher wholesale price. Yet, these conclusions rest on additional conditions, e.g. that
Z is IFR in part (i) of Theorem 4.3, and do not hold in full generality. This point is further
elaborated in Section 4.1.3.
4.1.3 Stochastically Larger Market
If we compare markets according to the usual stochastic order, then the conlusion that larger
markets give rise to higher wholesale prices seizes to hold and there exist instances of stochas-
tically larger markets, in which the supplier may charge a lower price. This relies on the fact
that the usual stochastic order does not imply (nor is implied by) the mrd-order, see [43]. This
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observation is in line with the intuition of [29] that “size is not everything” and that prices are
driven by different forces.
Formally, let X ∼ F, Y ∼ G denote two market instances, such that G¯ (r) ≤ F¯ (r) for all
r ≥ 0. In this case, Y is said to be less than X in the usual stochastic order, denoted by
Y st X. It is immediate that Y st X implies EY ≤ EX. The following example, adopted
from [44], shows that wholesale prices can be lower in stochastically larger markets. Specifically,
let X ∼ F be uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and let Y ∼ G have a piecewise linear distribution
with G (0) = 0, G (1/3) = 7/9, G (2/3) = 7/9 and G (1) = 1. Then, as the shown in Figure 1,
Y st X (right panel) but r∗X ≤ r∗Y (left panel).
Figure 1. F stochastically dominates G (right panel), yet r∗F < r
∗
G (left panel).
4.2 Market Demand Variability
The response of the equilibrium wholesale price to increasing (decreasing) demand variability is
even less straightforward. There exist several notions of stochastic orders that compare random
variables in terms of their variability and depending on which we employ, we derive conflicting
results. First, we introduce some notation.
4.2.1 Variability or Dispersive Orders
Let X1 ∼ F1 and X2 ∼ F2 be two nonnegative distributions with equal means, EX1 = EX2,
and finite second moments. If
∫∞
r F¯1 (u) du ≤
∫∞
r F¯2 (u) du for all r ≥ 0, then X1 is said to be
smaller than X2 in the convex order, denoted by X1 cx X2. If F−11 and F−12 denote the right
continuous inverses of F1, F2 and F
−1
1 (r) − F−11 (s) ≤ F−12 (r) − F−12 (s) for all 0 < r ≤ s < 1,
then X1 is said to be smaller than X2 in the dispersive order, denoted by X1 disp X2. Finally,
if
∫∞
F−11 (p)
F¯1 (u) du ≤
∫∞
F−12 (p)
F¯2 (u) du for all p ∈ (0, 1), then X1 is said to be smaller than X2 in
the excess wealth order, denoted by X1 ew Y . [43] show that X disp Y =⇒ X ew Y =⇒
X cx Y which in turn implies that Var (X) ≤ Var (Y ). Further insights and motivation on
these orders are provided in Chapter 3 of [43].
Does less variability imply a lower (higher) wholesale price? The answer to this
question largely depends on the notion of variability that we will employ. [49] use the more
general cx-order to conclude that under mild additional assumptions, less variability implies
higher prices. Concerning the present setting, ordering two demand distributions X ∼ F and
Y ∼ G in the cx-order does not in general suffice to conclude that wholesale prices in the X
and Y markets are ordered respectively. This is due to the fact that the cx-order does not
imply the mrd-order. An illustration is provided in Figures 2 and 3.
In Figure 2, we consider two demand distributions, X ∼ F , Lognormal (µ = 0.5, σ = 1)
and Y ∼ G, Gamma (α = 2, β = 0.25). For this choice of parameters, EX = EY = 0.5 and
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Figure 2. Comparison of X ∼ F , with F Lognormal (µ = 0.5, σ = 1) and Y ∼ G with G
Gamma (α = 2, β = 0.25). Y st X (right panel) and r∗Y < r∗X (left panel).
hence X,Y are ordered in the cx-order if and only if the tail-integrals of F and G are ordered,
see [43] Theorem 3.A.1. The right panel depicts the log of the ratio of these integrals, i.e.,
log
(∫∞
r F¯du/
∫∞
r G¯du
)
which remains throughout positive (and increasing). Hence, Y cx X.
The left panel depicts the price elasticities of expected demand in the X and Y markets. As
can be seen, the supplier charges a higher price in the X market (distribution F ) than in the
less variable (according to the cx-order) Y market (distribution G).
The above conclusion is reversed in the case of Figure 3. In this example, we consider two
demand distributions, X ∼ F with F , as above, Lognormal (µ = 0.5, σ = 1) and Y ∼ G, Gamma
(α = 8, β = 0.25/4). The choice of parameters ensures that the equality EX = EY = 0.5 is
retained and hence that X,Y can be ordered in the cx-order if and only if the tail-integrals of
F and G can be ordered. Again, the right panel depicts the log of the ratio of these integrals
which remains throughout positive (and increasing). Hence, Y cx X. However, the picture
in the left panel is now reversed. As can be seen, the supplier now charges a lower price in
the X market (distribution F ) than in the less variable (according to the cx-order) Y market
(distribution G).
Figure 3. Comparison of X ∼ F , with F Lognormal (µ = 0.5, σ = 1) and Y ∼ G with G
Gamma (α = 8, β = 0.25/4). Y st X (right panel) and r∗X < r∗Y (left panel).
More can be said, if we restrict attention to the ew- and disp-orders. We will write Li to
denote the lower end of the support of variable Xi for i = 1, 2.
Theorem 4.4. Let X1 ∼ F1, X2 ∼ F2 be two nonnegative, continuous, strictly DGMRD demand
distributions with finite second moment. In addition,
(i) if either X1 or X2 are DMRD and X1 ew X2, and if L1 ≤ L2, then r∗1 ≤ r∗2.
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(ii) if either X1 or X2 are IFR and X1 disp X2, then r∗1 ≤ r∗2.
The first part of Theorem 4.4 follows directly from Theorem 3.C.5 of [43]. Based on its
proof, the assumption that at least one of the two random variables is DMRD (and not merely
DGMRD) cannot be relaxed. Part (ii) follows directly from Theorem 3.B.20 (b) of [43] and the
fact that the hr-order implies the mrd-order. As in part (i), the condition that both X1 and
X2 are DGMRD does not suffice and we need to assume that at least one is IFR. Recall, that
IFR ⊂ DMRD ⊂ DGMRD with all inclusions being strict, see e.g. [30].
The first implication of Theorem 4.4 is that there exist classes of distributions for which less
variability implies lower wholesale prices. This is in contrast with the results of [29] and [49]
and sheds light on the effects of upstream demand uncertainty. In these models, uncertainty
falls to the retailer, and the supplier charges a higher price to capture an increasing share of all
supply chain profits as variability reduces. Contrarily, if uncertainty falls to the supplier as in
the present model, then the supplier may charge a lower price as variability increases.
The second implication is that these results, albeit general, do not apply to all distributions
that are comparable according to some variability order. As illustrated with the examples in
Figures 2 and 3, there exist notions of variability and demand distributions that can be ordered
according to these notions, for which less variability may not lead to conclusions about wholesale
prices. This demonstrates the usefulness of the characterization in (9). In contrast to existing
studies, by means of Lemma 4.1, one may use the diverse theory of stochastic orders to show
that conclusions regarding the effect of demand variability on prices crucially depend on the
exact notion of variability that will be employed and may be ambiguous even under the standard
setting of linear demand that is studied here.
4.2.2 Mean preserving transformation
To further study the effects of demand variability, one may use the mean preserving transforma-
tion Xκ := κX + (1− κ)µ, where µ = EX and κ ∈ [0, 1], see [32] and [31]. Indeed, EXκ = EX
and Var (Xκ) = κ
2Var (X) ≤ Var (X), i.e., Xκ has the same mean and support as but is “less
variable” than X. In this case, the following Theorem shows that Xκ mrd X and hence, by
Lemma 4.1 the supplier always sets a higher price in market X than in the “less variable”
market Xκ.
Theorem 4.5. Let X ∼ F be a nonnegative, continuous, DGMRD demand distribution with
finite mean, µ, and variance, σ2, and let Xκ := κX+(1− κ)µ, for κ ∈ [0, 1]. Then, Xκ mrd X
and r∗κ ≤ r∗.
Proof. It suffices to show that Y ≡ µ is smaller than X in the mrl-order, i.e., that Y mrd
X. The conclusion then follows from Theorem 2.A.18 of [43] and Lemma 4.1. In turn, to
show that Y mrd X, it suffices to show that
∫∞
x F¯X (u) du/
∫∞
x F¯Y (u) du increases in x over{
x :
∫∞
x F¯Y (u) du > 0
}
, cf. [43] (2.A.3). Since, F¯Y (u) = 1{x<µ}, this is equivalent to showing
that
∫∞
x F¯X (u) du/ (µ− x) increases in x for x < µ. Differentiating with respect to x and
reordering the terms, we obtain that the previous expression increases in x for x < µ if and only
if mX (x) ≥ µ − x for x ∈ [0, µ). However, this is immediate, since m (x) ≥
∫∞
x F¯X (u) du =
µ− ∫ x0 F¯X (u) du ≥ µ− x.
4.2.3 Parametric families of distributions
To further elaborate on the fact that different variability notions may lead to different responses
on wholesale prices, we consider the parametric approach of [29]. Given a random variable X
with distribution F , let Xi := δi + λiX with δi ≥ 0 and λi > 0 for i = 1, 2. [29] show that in
this case, the wholesale price is dictated by the coefficient of variation, CVi =
√
Var (Xi)/EXi.
Specifically, if CV2 < CV1, then r
∗
1 < r
∗
2, i.e., in their model, a lower CV , or equivalently a
lower relative variability, implies a higher price. This is not true for our model.
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To see this, we consider two normal demand distributions X1 ∼ N
(
µ1, σ
2
1
)
and X2 ∼
N
(
µ2, σ
2
2
)
. By Table 2.2 of [5], if σ1 < σ2 and µ1 ≤ µ2, then X1 mrd X2 and hence, by
Lemma 4.1, r∗1 ≤ r∗2. However, by choosing σi and µi appropriately, we can trivially achieve
an arbitrary ordering of their relative variability in terms of their CV ’s. The reason for this
ambiguity is that changing µi for i = 1, 2, not only affects CVi, i.e., the relative variability,
but also the central location of the respective demand distribution. In contrast, under the
assumption that EX1 = EX2, the stochastic orders approach of the previous paragraph provides
a more clear insight. The results of the comparative statics analysis are summarized in Table 2.
Demand Transformations Optimal Prices
X1 mrd X2 Z ≥ 0, IFR, independent of X1, X2 r∗X1+Z ≤ r∗X2+Z
φ (x) increasing and convex r∗φ(X1) ≤ r∗φ(X2)
Xp ∼ pF1 + (1− p)F2, p ∈ (0, 1) r∗X1 ≤ r∗Xp ≤ r∗X2
Market size
X c ≥ 1 r∗X ≤ r∗cX
X DMRD Z ≥ 0,EZ2 <∞, independent of X r∗X ≤ r∗X+Z
X1 st X2 inconclusive
Demand variability
X1 cx X2 inconclusive
X1 ew X2 L1 ≤ L2 and X1 or X2 DMRD r∗1 ≤ r∗2
X1 disp X2 X1 or X2 IFR r∗1 ≤ r∗2
Xi := δi + λiX CV1 ≤ CV2, δi ≥ 0, λi > 0, i = 1, 2 inconclusive
Xκ := κX + (1− κ)EX κ ∈ [0, 1] r∗κ ≤ r∗
Table 2. Summary of the main comparative statics results on the seller’s optimal price. If not
stated otherwise, X,X1, X2 satisfy throughout the unimodality conditions of Theorem 3.1, i.e.,
they are strictly DGMRD and have finite second moment.
5 Market Performance
We now turn to study the effect of upstream demand uncertainty on the efficiency of the
vertical market. Unless stated otherwise, and to avoid unnecessary notation, we consider the
classic Cournot competition with linear demand and arbitrary number n of competing retailers
in the second stage (Section 3.3). After scaling β to 1, this implies that the equilibrium order
quantities are q∗i (r) =
1
n+1 (α− r)+ for each i = 1, . . . , n and any wholesale price r ≥ 0. The
supplier’s optimal wholesale price, r∗, is given by Theorem 3.1.
5.1 Probability of no-trade
Markets with incomplete information are usually inefficient in the sense that trades that are
profitable for all market participants may actually not take place. In the current model, such
inefficiencies appear as values of α for which a transaction does not occur in equilibrium under
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incomplete information, although such a transaction would have been beneficial for all parties
involved, i.e., supplier, retailers and consumers.
If α < r∗, then the retailers buy 0 units and there is an immediate stockout. Hence, for
a continuous distribution F of α, the probabilitiy of no-trade in equilibrium under incomplete
information is equal to P (α ≤ r∗) = F (r∗). To study this probability as a measure of market
inefficiency, we restrict attention to the family of DMRD distributions, i.e., distributions for
which m (r) is non-increasing. In this case, we have
Theorem 5.1. For any demand distribution F with the DMRD property, the probability F (r∗)
of no-trade at the equilibrium of the stochastic market cannot exceed the bound 1 − e−1. This
bound is tight over all DMRD distributions.
Proof. Expressing the distribution function F in terms of the MRD function, e.g. see [16], we get
F (r∗) = 1− m(0)m(r∗) exp
{
− ∫ r∗0 1m(u)du}. Hence, by the DMRD property and the monotonicity of
the exponential function, it follows that F (r∗) ≤ 1− m(0)m(r∗) exp
{
− r∗m(r∗)
}
. Since r∗ = m (r∗) ≤
m (0), we conclude that F (r∗) ≤ 1−e−1. If the MRD function is constant, as is the case for the
exponential distribution, see Example 5.2, then all inequalities above hold as equalities, which
establishes the second claim of the Theorem.
Examples 5.2 and 5.3 highlight the tightness of the no-trade probability bound that is derived
in Theorem 5.1. Example 5.4 shows that this bound cannot be extended to the class of DGMRD
distributions. The conclusions are summarized in Figure 4.
Example 5.2 (Exponential distribution). Let α ∼ exp (λ), with λ > 0, and pdf f (r) = λe−λr
1{0≤r<∞}. Since m (r) = 1/λ, for r > 0, the MRD function is constant over its support
and, hence, F is both DMRD and IMRD but strictly DGMRD, as ` (r) = 1/λr, for r > 0.
By Theorem 3.1, the optimal strategy r∗ of the supplier is r∗ = 1/λ. The probability of no
transaction F (r∗) is equal to F (r∗) = F (1/λ) = 1 − e−1, confirming that the bound derived
in Theorem 5.1 is tight. Thus, the exponential distribution is the least favorable, over the class
of DMRD distributions, in terms of efficiency at equilibrium.
Example 5.3 (Beta distribution). This example refers to a special case of the Beta distribution,
also known as the Kumaraswamy distribution, see [21]. Let α ∼ Beta (1, λ) with λ > 0, and
pdf f (r) = λ (1− r)λ−1 1{0<r<1}. Then, F (r) = 1 − (1− r)λ and m (r) = (1− r) / (1 + λ) for
0 < r < 1. Since the MRD function is decreasing, Theorem 3.1 applies and the optimal price
of the supplier is r∗ = 1/ (λ+ 2). Hence, F (r∗) = 1 − (1− 1/ (λ+ 2))λ → 1 − e−1 as λ → ∞.
This shows that the upper bound of F (r∗) in Theorem 5.1 is still tight over distributions with
strictly decreasing MRD, i.e., it is not the flatness of the exponential MRD that generated the
large inefficiency.
Example 5.4 (Generalized Pareto or Pareto II distribution). This example shows that the
bound of Theorem 5.1 does not extend to the class of DGMRD distributions. Let α ∼
GPareto (µ, σ, k), with pdf f (r) = (1 + kz)−(1+1/k) /σ and cdf F (r) = 1 − (1 + kz)−1/k, with
z = (r − µ) /σ. For the parametrization µ < σ and σ = k = (2 + )−1, with  > 0, the cdf
becomes F (r) = 1 − (1 + r − µ)−(2+). Moreover, Eα2 < ∞, since k < 1/2 for any  > 0.
Hence, by a standard calculation, m (r) = (1 + r − µ) (1 + ), which shows that F is DGMRD
but not DMRD. In this case, r∗ = (1− µ) / and F (r∗) = 1− ((1 + ) (1− µ) /)−(2+), which
shows that the probability of a stockout may become arbitrarily large for values of  close to 0.
The “pathology” of this example relies on the fact that Eα2 →∞ as ↘ 0.
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Figure 4. Probability F (r∗) of no-trade for the Exponential (λ), Beta (1, λ) and Pareto II(
µ = 0.02, σ = k = (2 + )−1
)
distributions: left, center and right panel respectively. The Ex-
ponential and Beta distributions are DMRD and satisfy the 1− e−1 bound. In contrast, for the
choosen range of parameter values, the Pareto II (or Generalized Pareto) is DGMRD but not
DMRD and exhibits no-trade probability that is arbitrarily close to 1.
5.2 Division of realized market profits
If the realized value of α is larger than r∗, then a transaction between the supplier and the
retailers takes place. In this case, we measure market efficiency in terms of the realized market
profits. Specifically, we fix a demand distribution F (which satisfies the sufficiency conditions
of Theorem 3.1) with support S (with upper and lower bounds L and H respectively, as defined
in Section 2) and a realized demand level α ∈ S and compare the individual realized profits of
the supplier and each retailer between the deterministic and the stochastic markets. For clarity,
we summarize the necessary quantities in Table 3.
Upstream Demand for the Supplier
Uncertain α ∼ F Deterministic α
Equilibrium
Wholesale Price
r∗ = mF (r∗) r∗ = α/2
Realized Profits at Equilibrium
Supplier ΠUs =
n
n+1r
∗ (α− r∗)+ ΠDs = nn+1 (α/2)2
Retailer i ΠUi =
1
(n+1)2
(
(α− r∗)+
)2
ΠDi =
1
(n+1)2
(α/2)2
Aggregate ΠUAgg = Π
U
s +
∑n
i=1 Π
U
i Π
D
Agg = Π
U
s +
∑n
i=1 Π
U
i
Table 3. Wholesale price and realized profits in equilibrium for the stochastic (left column) and
the deterministic (right column) markets. The realized equilibrium profits correspond to fixed
demand level α ∈ S.
We are interested in addressing the following questions: First, how do the supplier’s (re-
tailers’) realized profits compare between the stochastic and the deterministic market? Second,
how does retail competition and demand uncertainty affect the supplier’s (retailers’) share of
realized market profits? Third, how does the level or retail competition – number n of retailers
– affect supplier’s profits in both markets? The answers are summarized in Theorem 5.5 which
follows rather immediately from Table 3. To avoid technicalities, we assume throughout that
the upper bound H of the support S is large enough, so that H > 2r∗ (e.g. H =∞).
Theorem 5.5. Let F denote a demand distribution with support S within L and H, r∗ the
respective optimal wholesale price in the stochastic market such that H > 2r∗, and α ∈ S, with
α > r∗, a realized demand level, for which trading between supplier and retailers takes place
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in both the stochastic and the deterministic market. Let, also, ΠUs /Π
U
Agg and Π
D
s /Π
D
Agg denote
the supplier’s share of realized profits in the stochastic and deterministic markets respectively.
Then,
(i) ΠUs ≤ ΠDs , with equality only for α = 2r∗. In particular, ΠUs /ΠDs = 4 (r∗/α) (1− r∗/α)
for any α > r∗.
(ii) ΠUs /Π
U
Agg decreases in the realized demand level α.
(iii) ΠDs /Π
D
Agg is independent of the demand level α.
(iv) ΠUs /Π
U
Agg is higher than Π
D
s /Π
D
Agg for values of α ∈ (r∗, 2r∗), equal for α = 2r∗, and lower
otherwise.
(v) ΠDs /Π
D
Agg and Π
U
s /Π
U
Agg both increase in the level n of retail competition.
Finally, each retailer’s profit in the stochastic market, ΠUi , is strictly higher than her profit in
the deterministic market ΠDi for all demand levels α > 2r
∗ and less otherwise, with equality for
α = 2r∗ only.
Proof. By Table 3, we have that: (i) ΠUs ≤ ΠDs if and only if nn+1r∗ (α− r∗)+ ≤ nn+1 (α/2)2
which holds with strict inequality for all values of α, except for α = 2r∗ for which the quan-
tities are equal. The second part of statement (i) is immediate. For (ii)
(
ΠUs
)
/
(
ΠUAgg
)
=
(nr∗ + r∗) / (nr∗ + α), and for (iii)
(
ΠDs
)
/
(
ΠDAgg
)
= (n+ 1) / (n+ 2). Now, (iv) and (v) di-
rectly follow from the previous calculations. Finally, ΠUi ≥ ΠDi if and only if
1
(n+ 1)2
(
(α− r∗)+
)2 ≥ 1
(n+ 1)2
(α/2)2
which holds with strict inequality for all values of α > 2r∗ and with equality for α = 2r∗.
The statements of Theorem 5.5 are rather intuitive. (i) The supplier is always better off if
he is informed about the retail demand level. (ii) In the stochastic market, he captures a larger
share of the realized market profits for lower values of realized demand (but not lower than the
no-trade threshold of r∗) whereas in the deterministic market (iii) his share of profits is constant
with respect to the demand level. (iv) Yet, in the stochastic market, there exists an interval
of demand realizations, namely (r∗, 2r∗), for which the supplier’s profits (although less than
in the deterministic market) represent a larger share of the aggregate market profits. In any
case, (v) retail competition benefits the supplier. Finally, in the case that the supplier prices
under uncertainty, each retailer makes a larger profit for higher realized demand values which
abides to intuition. These observations confirm the existence of conflicting incentives regarding
demand-information disclosure between the retailers and the supplier.
5.2.1 Deterministic and stochastic markets: aggregate profits
We next turn to the comparison of the aggregate market profits between the deterministic and
the stochastic market. As before, we fix a demand distribution F (which is again assumed to
satisfy the sufficiency conditions of Theorem 3.1) with support S within L and H, and evaluate
the ratio ΠUAgg/Π
D
Agg of the aggregate realized market profits in the stochastic market to the
aggregate market profits in the deterministic market. To study market performance under
the two scenarios, we need to evaluate the combined effect of two competing forces: demand
uncertainty and retail competition. For a realized demand α ≤ r∗, there is a stockout and the
realized aggregated profits ΠUAgg are equal to 0. In this case, the stochastic market performs
arbitrarily worse than the deterministic market and the ratio is equal to 0 for any number
n ≥ 1 of competing retailers. Hence, for a non-trivial analysis, we study the question of how
good can the stochastic market perform when compared to the deterministic market. We have
the following
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Theorem 5.6. Let F denote a demand distribution with support S within L and H, r∗ the
respective optimal wholesale price in the stochastic market and α ∈ S, with α > r∗, a realized de-
mand level, for which trading between supplier and retailers takes place in both the stochastic and
the deterministic market. Again, to avoid technicalities, and to ensure that H > 2nr∗/ (n− 2)
for any n ≥ 3, we assume that H is large enough, e.g. H = ∞. Let, also, ΠUAgg/ΠDAgg denote
the ratio of the aggregate realized profits in the stochastic market to the aggregate profits in the
deterministic market. Then,
(i) ΠUAgg/Π
D
Agg > 1 for α ∈ (r∗,∞), if n = 1, α ∈ (2r∗,∞) if n = 2 and α ∈
(
2r∗, 2nn−2r
∗
)
if
n ≥ 3.
(ii) ΠUAgg/Π
D
Agg is maximized for α
∗ = 2nr∗/ (n− 1) for n ≥ 2, for which it is equal to 1 +
(n (n+ 2))−1. Moreover, ΠUAgg/Π
D
Agg converges to 4/ (n+ 2) as α→∞ for any n ≥ 1.
(iii) ΠUAgg/Π
D
Agg increases in the level of competition for demand levels α < 2r
∗ and decreases
thereafter.
Proof. By Table 3, a direct substitution yields that
ΠUAgg/Π
D
Agg = 4 (α− r∗) (α+ nr∗) /[(n+ 2)α2]
for α > r∗. Taking the derivative of the ratio with respect to α yields
∂
∂α
(
4 (α− r∗) (α+ nr∗)
(n+ 2)α2
)
=
4
(n+ 2)α3
(2nr∗ − (n− 1)α)
which shows that the ratio is increasing
[
r∗, 2nn−1r
∗
)
, and decreasing thereafter. In particular,
the values of α for which the ratio is larger than or equal to 1 are α ∈ (r∗,∞), for n = 1,
α ∈ [2r∗,∞) for n = 2 and α ∈
[
2r∗, 2nn−2r
∗
]
for n ≥ 3. This establishes (i) and after some
trivial algebra, also (ii). To obtain (iii) we take the partial derivative of ΠUAgg/Π
D
Agg with respect
to n.
Theorem 5.6 asserts that there exists an interval of realized demand values, whose upper
bound depends on the number n of competing retailers, for which the stochastic market out-
performs the deterministic market in terms of aggregate profits, (i). The effect of increasing
retail competition on the aggregate profits of the stochastic market is twofold. First, the range
(interval) of demand values for which the ratio of aggregate profits exceeds 1 reduces to a single
point as competition increases (n→∞). Second, for larger values of realized demand, the ratio
converges to 4/ (n+ 2) as α → ∞. This shows that uncertainty on the side of the supplier is
less detrimental for the aggregate market profits when the level of retail competition is low. In
particular, for n = 1, 2, the aggregate profits of the stochastic market remain strictly higher
than the profits of the deterministic market for all large enough realized demand levels. As
competition increases this remains true only for lower (but still above the no-trade threshold)
demand levels. However, for higher demand realizations, the ratio degrades linearly in the
number of competing retailers.
The statements of Theorem 5.6 are illustrated in Figure 5. Here α ∼ Gamma (2, 2) but the
picture is essentially the same for any choice of demand distribution that satisfies the sufficiency
conditions of Theorem 3.1 and for which H is large enough, i.e., H > 2r∗.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we studied optimal pricing by a monopolist who is facing linear stochastic demand.
By characterizing the price elasticity of expected demand and the seller’s optimal price in
terms of the mean residual demand (MRD) function of the demand distribution, we analyzed
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Figure 5. The left panel depicts the ratio ΠUAgg/Π
D
Agg for n = 2, 5 and 8, where α ∼ Gamma (2, 2).
The dashed line shows the points α = 2nr∗/ (n− 1) in which the ratios are maximized, taking
the value 1 + (n (n+ 2))−1. The right panel magnifies the interval [4, 7] around the intersection
point α = 2r∗ of the three curves. The ratio increases in n prior to the intersection point,
2r∗ ≈ 5.657, and decreases in n thereafter.
responses of optimal prices to various market characteristics. The main theoretical finding is
that if two markets can be ordered in terms of their mean residual demand function, then
the seller’s optimal prices can be ordered accordingly. In economic terms, the MRD function
describes the expected additional demand given that current demand has reached or exceeded
a certain threshold. Further movements of prices in response to market size, demand updates
and variability largerly depend on the exact measure or notion that will be used. This is
illustrated via the theory of stochastic orders in Table 2. For instance, comparing markets
in terms of their coefficients of variation and in terms of variability stochastic orders may
result in different conclusions about the effect of demand variability on optimal prices. Further
managerial insight from the present analysis indicates that market performance and division of
profits among market participants depend on the competing forces of retail competition and
demand uncertainty.
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